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by Karl H. Schlag
Abstract
The effect of cheap talk in partnership games on the evolutionary dynamics
of homogeneous populations under symmetric and random matching is analyzed.
As long as the message set is sufficiently large there exists an Asymptotically
Stable Set with payoffs arbitrarily close to the maximal payoff for each player.
However this only holds true for each Asymptotically Stable Set if there are no more
than two strategies. Our results underline the importance of large message sets and
reveal the implicit coordination device that drives the efficiency results in the
alternative two type population models.
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1. Introduction:
We are interested in the effect of communication on the outcomes of
dynamic processes in random matching models. Communication is modelled as
cheap talk: before the game is played, the players simultaneously exchange
messages from some finite set of messages. There is no cost to exchanging these
messages and hence "talk is cheap".
The games in which we embed our analysis are restricted to partnership
games (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1988). These are symmetric games in which each
player gets the same payoff. They are also referred to as symmetric pure
coordination games (Matsui, 1989). In such games the maximal payoff a player can
receive is the same for each player and coincides with the only efficient outcome. It
seems that partnership games should be an ideal framework in which
communication should be advantageous and perhaps even in a dynamic setup
drive payoffs to the maximal payoff. 
There are various models of cheap talk and similar models of communication
that seem to confirm this intuition.
1.1 The literature
Matsui (1989) analyzes cheap talk in pure coordination games and assumes
that the population is divided into two types. When the players are randomly
matched one type is always matched against the other type, i.e., an individual is
never matched against the same type. Under these assumptions Matsui (1989)
shows that cheap talk leads to efficiency in the best response dynamics.
Robson (1990) introduces a model with secret handshakes among the
mutants. It is assumed that a mutant can recognize when he is matched against
another mutant but the rest of the population cannot distinguish them other than by
the strategies they play. Robson (1990) shows for two by two unanimity games (A3
unanimity game is a partnership game in which the payoffs are positive on the main
diagonal and zero otherwise) that an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) must
achieve the maximal payoff (i.e., achieves the maximal payoff against the same
strategy). 
Wärneryd (1991) shows that in symmetric two by two unanimity games with
cheap talk a pure strategy is a weak ESS if and only if it achieves the maximal
payoff. 
In section 6 the above literature is examined in more detail.
All these results seem to point out that cheap talk leads to efficiency at least
in unanimity games. To follow up this conjecture we will set up a basic model and
analyze what cheap talk can achieve in a dynamic framework with as little additional
structure as possible. The only previous dynamic analysis of cheap talk was done
by Matsui (1989, 1991) for a two type population model.
1.2 The solution concept
Before going into the details of the communication and game structure we
would like to present the solution concept. 
We will consider a dynamic adjustment process in an infinite population
pairwise randomly matched to play a symmetric two person game. In order to
eliminate coordination devices other than communication we will assume that the
population is homogeneous and that the matching is symmetric. This means that
neither in the matching nor in the reproduction process nor when the players are
playing the game are there any asymmetries, in particular, there is no distinguishing
between row and column players. Each individual in the population will be
completely characterized by a pure strategy of the game he plays when he is
matched. 
Now we will introduce the dynamic adjustment process known as replicator       The restriction to a one time entrance can be slightly generalized. In another
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paper, Schlag (1990) presents a scenario in which a population with mean in an
Asymptotically Stable Set can "resist" repeated mutations. The condition is that
each time only a sufficiently small frequency of mutants enters.
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dynamics and the solution concept of asymptotic stability.
Maynard Smith and Price (1973) defined the notion of an Evolutionarily
Stable Strategy (ESS) for symmetric two person games. The definition was
motivated by some intuition for a strategy with fitness derived from this game to
survive in an evolutionary process with infrequent mutations. Later Taylor and
Jonker (1978) and Zeeman (1990) showed that all ESS are Asymptotically Stable
Strategies of the (continuous) replicator dynamics. The replicator dynamics are the
approximation of the following discrete time process defined in an infinite population
of individuals, each playing a pure strategy. In each period individuals are pairwise
randomly matched to play a game, receive a payoff and then reproduce
proportionally to the relative payoff they received. After that they die. 
The relevant solution concept in dynamic adjustment processes is that of
Asymptotically Stable Sets (AS Sets) and Asymptotically Stable Strategies (ASS).
Such an AS Set has the property that it is closed and that trajectories starting in a
neighborhood of it stay close to the initial starting point and eventually converge to
an element of the set. The element a singleton Asymptotically Stable Set (AS Set)
(i.e., it contains one element) is called an Asymptotically Stable Strategy (ASS). A
population with mean in such a set can resist a one time mutation of sufficiently
small frequency in the sense that the perturbed population will stay close and
eventually its mean will converge to an element of the set.1 However, ESS is a
fairly demanding concept which often fails to exist. Later Thomas (1985) defined the
notion of an Evolutionarily Stable Set (ES  Set) that contains the definition of an
ESS when the ES Set is a singleton set. He showed that ES Sets are
Asymptotically Stable Sets (AS Sets). Although a weaker concept, ES Sets need
not exist even when AS Sets do.
In an attempt to avoid confusion of these similar terms we present a diagram
at the end of the paper showing their interdependencies.
An Asymptotically Stable Strategy (ASS) fails to exist when strategies are5
duplicated. Asymptotically Stable Sets (AS Sets) on the other hand are independent
of so called spurious duplification of strategies. In population models there are a
large number of individuals. The partition of these individuals into types seems
arbitrary and it is not clear why names should affect the stability concept. In another
paper, Schlag (1990) argues this point in more detail outgoing from the sensitivity of
the ESS concept to spurious duplification. They resolve the problematic by defining
a weaker concept called Equivalent Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (eESS). 
We therefore find it most natural to search for Asymptotically Stable Sets (AS
Sets) and when they appear as singleton sets to treat this as a special case. 
1.3 Partnership games
We will restrict our attention to partnership games (for a definition thereof see
above). Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988) prove for partnership games that the
Asymptotically Stable Strategies (ASS) of the replicator dynamics are precisely the
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESS) of the game. We prove the same identity for
the case of sets: in partnership games, Evolutionarily Stable Sets (ES Sets) are
Asymptotically Stable Sets (AS Sets) and vice versa. These relations are included
into the diagram at the end of the paper. Additionally, we show that AS Sets always
exist in partnership games: the set of strategies that achieve the maximal average
payoff is an AS Set. Hence our solution concept of determining the AS Sets always
generates at least one solution and alternative solution concepts of the dynamic
adjustment process must not be developed. The above characterization of
Asymptotically Stable Sets (AS Sets) is useful because AS Sets and other features
of dynamic adjustment processes are not simple to calculate whereas ES Sets can
be calculated without reference to the dynamics.
1.4 Cheap talk
The next stage is to introduce cheap talk to the partnership game. Before the
game is played each individual sends a message from a finite set of messages. A
strategy of the resulting communication game then consists of a message that is6
sent and a reaction function that, based on the message received specifies which
strategy of the game is played. Individuals now are endowed with such
communication strategies and the replicator dynamics based on this enlarged
symmetric game will be analyzed. It follows that if the underlying game is a
partnership game then so is the enlarged communication game. Following the
above remarks on the equivalence of ES Sets and AS Sets in partnership games
our goal will be to characterize the ES Sets of the communication game.
As a benchmark case we first investigate how this effects partnership games
which have a pure strategy that dominates all other strategies in the game (such a
strategy we will call dominant). Games with a dominant pure strategy have very
"robust" dynamics: there is a unique Evolutionarily Stable Set (ES Set) and it
contains all dominant strategies. It seems intuitive that cheap talk should not
change such a stable situation. On closer examination though it turns out that
dominant strategies often fail to exist when cheap talk is added to the game. The
maximal payoff that can be achieved depends not only on the strategy played but
also on the signal sent. Still the dynamic stability is preserved in partnership games
that have a dominant pure strategy: there is a unique ES Set in which only
strategies that dominate all others in the original game are played.
However outside partnership games the stability of a dominant pure strategy
is not necessarily preserved when cheap talk is added. In the appendix we present
an example to demonstrate this fact. The game is a symmetric two by two game
(that is not a partnership game) with a dominant strategy that yields the efficient
outcome. Without cheap talk the dominant strategy as a singleton set is the unique
Asymptotically Stable Set (AS Set). However when cheap talk is added to this
game, AS Sets no longer exist. 
So in general games the addition of cheap talk might be harmful to the
stability properties of the dynamics of the game. However this cannot happen in
partnership games: with or without cheap talk they will always have an
Evolutionarily Stable Set (ES Set). This follows from the existence theorem for
partnership games.
Next we consider strategies with excess messages, i.e., ones in which not all7
messages are sent, and characterize whether they are contained in an ES Set or
not. We show that a strategy that does not send each signal with positive probability
is contained in an Evolutionarily Stable Set (ES Set) if and only if it achieves the
maximal payoff. The intuition is that if a population in an ES Set does not use all
signals then a neighboring population in the ES Set will play a slightly different
mean strategy when receiving the unused signal. Repeating this argument it follows
that there will be a population in the ES Set that plays the strategy that leads to the
maximal payoff when receiving the unused message. Consequently a mutant can
take advantage of this population and take over. 
As a corollary we obtain that a strategy of the communication game in which
the same action is played disrespect of the messages received will be contained in
an ES Set of the communication game if and only if the action achieves the efficient
payoff. The intuition is that since the messages are not used for coordination
consequently some element of the ES Set will not send each message. Together
with the previous result this implies the statement. So constant play of inefficient
actions of the partnership game are ruled out by cheap talk, especially inefficient ES
Sets of the original game are eliminated. However we will find out that cheap talk
also creates ES Sets, these will be sets in which each element sends each
message.
Next we show that cheap talk shifts the range of payoffs in ES Sets upwards.
How does the ES Set that obtains the largest payoff look? In a game where the
maximal payoff is realized in a symmetric outcome, the largest payoff in an ES Set
is the same with or without cheap talk (see existence theorem for ES Sets in
partnership games). However in games where this is not the case, the maximal
average payoff in the communication game (which is equal to the largest payoff in
an ES Set) is larger than in the game without communication. Additionally the larger
the message set, the closer this payoff gets to the efficient or maximal one.
The increasing effect cheap talk has on the average payoffs in ES Sets can
also be shown for the minimal payoff. We show that unless all payoffs in ES Sets
are equal to the maximal payoff, the average payoff in any ES Set of the game with8
cheap talk is strictly greater than the minimal average payoff in an ES Set of the
game without cheap talk.
1.5 Efficiency
It turns out that the above increasing effect of cheap talk on the payoffs in ES
Sets is sufficient to guarantee "near" efficiency in partnership games with only two
strategies given that the message set is large. We characterize all ES Sets for each
possible partnership game with two strategies and show that the minimal average
payoff in an ES Set (which increases with the number of signals) converges to the
efficient payoff.
However these efficiency results for partnership games with two strategies
represent a special case and do not generally extend to games with more than two
strategies. We present a simple partnership game (unanimity game) with three
strategies that has an ESS with average payoff bounded away from the maximal
payoff for any size of the message set. The ESS uses each message with positive
probability. Consequently a mutant cannot coordinate with a type in the population
to get the efficient payoff without sacrificing payoffs. So cheap talk will generally not
drive all payoffs in Evolutionarily Stable Sets (ES Sets) of the replicator dynamics
close to the maximal payoff.
To summarize, we analyze the effects of cheap talk in homogeneous
populations that are symmetrically and randomly matched and evolve according to
the replicator dynamics. Cheap talk need not be advantageous if the game is not a
partnership game. It can destroy stability in a symmetric two by two game. However
in partnership games it has a positive effect, the more messages the better: the
range of payoffs in AS Sets is increased and for two by two games all outcomes in
AS Sets become nearly efficient. However cheap talk fails to guarantee efficiency
when there are more than two strategies in the game.
In section 6 we present the related literature on cheap talk. We give the9
intuition that leads to our inefficiency result and point out the structure that is










Consider a symmetric two person game ’(S,E) with the pure strategies
S={e, i=1,..,N} and the payoff function E:)S×)S6U where )S is the set of
i
probability distributions on S, i.e., )S={x0U  s.t. x$0 and  x=1}. For x0)S let
N
i     i
BR(x) be the set of best replies to the strategy x, i.e.,
BR(x)={y0)S s.t. E(y,x)$E(z,x) for all z0)S}. For x0)S let C(x) be the support of x,
i.e., C(x)={e0S s.t. x>0}. For e0S we will sometimes write x(e) instead of x. To
i         i           i
i                     i
simplify notation we will not distinguish between the pure strategy e0S and the
distribution on S that assigns unit probability to e (i.e., S is embedded in )S),
especially, ½e +½e 0)S.
1 2
The replicator dynamics of ’(S,E) on )S for continuous time and pure
strategy types is as follows:
x =x and  ; t$0,
0 !
where x0)S is the initial state and x  is the frequency of the type using strategy e
!             t                  i
i
(e0S) at time t. It can be shown that for each x0)S the above differential equation
i                      !
defines a unique function x:U 6)S. To simplify notation we will drop the parameter t
+
from the expressions (e.g., x=x).
t
In this context Lf)S is called an Evolutionarily Stable Set (ES Set, Thomas,
1985) if
i) L is closed,
ii) if p0L then p0BR(p) and
iii) for any p0L there exists an open neighborhood U(p) such that E(p,x)$E(x,x) for
all x0U(p)1BR(p) and where E(p,x)=E(x,x) implies x0L.
Thomas (1985) shows that the definition is not changed if "BR(p)" is left out
of condition iii). Once the "BR(p)" term is left out, condition ii) follows from the
alternative condition iii): Assume that p0L\BR(p). Then there exists z0)S such that
E(p,p)<E(z,p). For 80(0,1), let x =(1!8)p+8z. Then for sufficiently small 8>0,
811
E(p,x )<E(z,x ) which is equivalent to E(p,x )<E(x ,x ) and thus contradicts condition
8 8           8 8 8
iii).
This gives us an alternative definition which contains precisely those
properties that will drive the subsequent stability results. 
Lf)S is an ES Set if and only if L is closed and for any p0L there exists an
open neighborhood U(p) such that E(p,x)$E(x,x) for all x0U(p) and where
E(p,x)=E(x,x) implies x0L.
An Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) is a special case of an Evolutionarily
Stable Set (ES Set): a strategy p0)S is called an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy
(ESS) (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973) if {p} is an Evolutionarily Stable Set (ES
Set).
Thomas (1985) shows the following properties of an Evolutionarily Stable Set
(ES Set). If a connected ES Set contains an ESS then it contains no other
strategies, the union of ES Sets is an ES Set and a maximal connected subset of
an ES Set is also an ES Set. 
Simple calculation shows that every symmetric game with two strategies has
an Evolutionarily Stable Set (ES Set). In comparison, every generic symmetric two
by two game has an ESS (van Damme, 1991). However for more than two
strategies this must not hold any more. Van Damme (1991) presents an example of
a game with a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium where the equilibrium strategy is
not an ESS. Because of the uniqueness of the symmetric Nash equilibrium neither
can the equilibrium strategy be in an Evolutionarily Stable Set (ES Set).
Additionally it is easy to show that the concept of an ES Set is "independent"
of spurious duplification of strategies, i.e., of the addition of pure strategies with
payoffs identical to some existing pure strategy. Elsewhere (Schlag, 1990), we
formalize the notion of independence with respect to spurious duplifications. The
addition of identical strategies expands the strategy space of the game. In this
context "independent" essentially means that ES sets of the expanded game are
expansions of the ES sets of the original game.
We now come to the most important property that justifies the use of the ESx
tk
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Set as a solution concept. Thomas (1985) proved the pendant of the Taylor and
Jonker (1978) and Zeeman (1980) result on the sufficiency of an ESS for the
asymptotic stability of a strategy. We will first give a short review of the dynamic
stability concepts.
A strategy p0)S is called a dynamic equilibrium if it is a fixed point of the
replicator dynamics. A set Lf)S is called attracting if there exists an open
neighborhood W of L such that each trajectory starting in W converges to L
(Wf)S). A strategy p0)S is called stable if for every open neighborhood U of p
there exists an open neighborhood V of p s.t. the trajectories starting in V do not
leave U (U,Vf)S). A set Lf)S is called stable if every p0L is stable. A set Lf)S is
called a (locally) Asymptotically Stable Set (AS Set) if it is closed, attracting and
stable. A singleton AS Set is called an Asymptotically Stable Strategy (ASS).
In the following we add some notes on the above definitions. A strategy
starting in W converges to L (L,Wf)S) if for any x0W and (t )  such that t 64 when
!
k k0ø      k
k64 (t 0U) it follows that inf{dist( ,z), z0L}60 as k64 where x solves the replicator k
t
dynamics starting at x =x. The definition of stability is slightly stronger than the
0 !
classical one (see e.g. Bhatia and Szegö, 1970): in the standard definition the set
as a whole must be stable, not necessarily each point. Finally, w.l.o.g. we require
additionally to the standard definition (Bhatia and Szegö, 1970) for the
asymptotically stable set to be closed. We find it intuitive to include dynamic
equilibria on the border into the definition of an AS set.
Notice that the union of finitely many AS Sets is again an AS Set. Now we
can state the sufficiency theorem.
THEOREM 2.1 (Thomas, 1985): 
If Lf)S is an Evolutionarily Stable Set (ES Set) then L is an Asymptotically
Stable Set (AS Set) w.r.t. the (continuous) replicator dynamics. The converse is not
true.




Table I: A general partnership game with
two strategies.
3. Partnership games:
A symmetric game ’(S,E) is called a partnership game (Hofbauer and
Sigmund, 1988) if E(e,e')=E(e',e) for all e,e'0S. So a partnership game is a
symmetric game in which both players always get the same payoff. These games
can also be referred to as pure coordination games (Matsui, 1989) that are
symmetric. However in the context of homomorphic populations it does not seem to
be appropriate to talk about coordination when there may be strict Nash equilibria
that are not necessarily symmetric.
For the case of |S|=2, the payoffs in a general partnership game are given in
table I where a,b,c0U are parameters.
The payoff structure of partnership games has a particular characteristic that
is not necessarily true for more general games, namely that the average payoff in a
population is constant on any connected set of symmetric Nash equilibria.
LEMMA 3.1:
If ’(S,E) is a partnership game and Gf)S is connected with the property that
x0G implies x0BR(x), then x,y0N implies E(x,x)=E(y,y).
PROOF:14
Assume that Gf)S is connected and x0G implies x0BR(x). For the proof we
will need the following claim:
Claim: w.l.o.g. G is piecewise convex, i.e., for any x,y0G there exists j0ø and z0G,
i
i=0,1,..j such that z =x, z =y and ½z+½z 0G for i=0,1,..j!1.
0   n     i i+1
We will just sketch the proof of the claim. Assume {y, x , k0ø}fG and
k
dist(x ,y)60 as k64. Then it follows that C(y)fC(x )fBR(x )1BR(y) if k is sufficiently
k               k k
large. Furthermore BR(x )1BR(y)fBR(½x +½y), so if k is sufficiently large,
k k
½x +½y0BR(½x +½y) and w.l.o.g. ½x +½y0G. The rest follows quite easily.
k k       k
Notice that this property can be shown for any symmetric game ’(S,E).
Using the above claim the lemma will be proven if we show that
E(x,x)=E(y,y) when x,y and ½x+½y0G.
Assume not, i.e., w.l.o.g. E(x,x)>E(y,y) which implies
E(x,½x+½y)!E(y,½x+½y)=½[E(x,x)!E(y,y)]>0. However ½x+½y0G implies that
C(½x+½y)=C(x)cC(y)fBR(½x+½y) and therefore E(x,½x+½y)!E(y,½x+½y)=0
which is a contradiction.
G
The following theorem due to Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988) presents some
more properties that are specific to partnership games.
THEOREM 3.2: (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1988)
The following claims hold for the replicator dynamics of a partnership game:
i) A strategy p0)S is an Asymptotically Stable Strategy (ASS) if and only if it is an
ESS.
ii) The average payoff in the population strictly increases over time if the trajectory
is not at a rest point of the replicator dynamics.
In the biology literature part ii) of the above theorem is called the fundamental
theorem of natural selection (see Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1988). The next theorem
generalizes the ideas from the above theorem to sets of strategies. 15
For a population with the mean x0)S we will call E(x,x) the average payoff of
the population x. We say that x0)S achieves the maximal payoff if E(x,x)$E(y,z) for
any y,z0)S (i.e., (x,x) is efficient). We say that x achieves the maximal average
payoff if E(x,x)$E(y,y) for all y0)S. 
We show that in partnership games all AS Sets of the replicator dynamics
are ES Sets and vice versa. Furthermore a connected subset is an AS Set if and
only if it maximizes the average payoff in a neighborhood containing the best
replies. 
THEOREM 3.3:
Let ’(S,E) be a partnership game and Lf)S be connected. Then the
following statements are equivalent:
i) L is a Evolutionarily Stable Set (ES Set).
ii) L is a Asymptotically stable set (AS Set).
iii) There exists a neighborhood U(L) such that for p,z0L and x0{U(p)cBR(p)}\L,
E(x,x)<E(p,p)=E(z,z).
In particular {x0)S s.t. E(x,x)$E(y,y) for all y0)S} is an Evolutionarily Stable
Set (ES Set) of ’ that is not necessarily connected.
PROOF:
i) implies ii) is stated in theorem 2.1
ii) implies iii):
Let Lf)S be a connected AS Set containing p. Van Damme (1991) shows
that stable strategies must be symmetric Nash equilibrium strategies. Using lemma
3.1 it follows that Lf{x0)S s.t. E(x,x)=E(p,p)}. Since L is attracting there exists an
open neighborhood U of p such that U\L contains no dynamic equilibria and
trajectories starting in U converge to L. By part ii) of theorem 3.2 E(x,x) increases
strictly when x is not a dynamic equilibrium and hence E(x,x)<E(p,p) for all x0U\L.
This shows that statement iii) is true in a neighborhood of p.
We will now show that w.l.o.g. BR(p)fU. For x0BR(p) and 80[0,1] let
p =(1!8)p+8x, then  E(p ,p )=(1!8) E(p,p)+28(1!8)E(x,p)+8 E(x,x)=
8      8 8 2 2
(1!8 )E(p,p)+8 E(x,x). So E(p ,p )=E(p,p) for all 80[0,1] if and only if E(x,x)=E(p,p)





and either E(x,x)<E(p,p) or E(x,x)=E(p,p) and p 0L for all 80[0,1] (especially x0L). 
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iii) implies i):
Let Lf)S be a connected set and U(p) be a neighborhood of L such that for
p,z0L, x0U(p)\L, E(x,x)<E(p,p)=E(z,z). It follows from the continuity of E( ) that L is
closed. 
We will now show that L is a set of symmetric Nash equilibria. Let p0L. For
80(0,1) and y0)S define p =(1!8)p+8y. Then if 8 is sufficiently small then
8
E(p,p)$E(p ,p ) which implies (2!8)E(p,p)$2(1!8)E(y,p)+8E(y,y). It follows that
8 8
E(p,p)$E(y,p) which means that p0BR(p). 
Let y0BR(p). Then E(p,y)=E(y,p)=E(p,p)$E(y,y) and E(p,y)=E(y,y) implies
y0L. Hence L is an ES Set.
Finally to the "in particular" statement:
L={x0)S s.t. E(x,x)$E(y,y) for all y0)S} can be split into a union of disjunct
connected sets, each trivially satisfying condition iii) of the theorem. Therefore L is
an ES Set.
G
Due to part iii) of the above theorem we will sometimes refer to the average
payoff of a connected ES Set when we mean the average payoff of one of its
elements. Using theorem 3.3 the Asymptotically Stable Sets (AS Sets) of the
replicator dynamics for partnership games can now be fully characterized by
calculating the Evolutionarily Stable Sets (ES Sets) of the game. This simplifies the
analysis substantially. 
For example, let us calculate the Asymptotically Stable Sets (AS Sets) for
some two by two partnership games. Consider the game in table I. If (a,b,c)=(2,0,1)
then the AS Sets are {T} and {B}, if (a,b,c)=(1,2,0) then the unique AS Set is
{ T+ B} (Only the symmetric Nash equilibrium strategies must be checked to find
the elements of an AS Set).17
A special class of partnership games that we will use as a benchmark will be
those that have a dominant pure strategy.
We will say that the strategy x0)S (weakly) dominates the strategy y0)S if
E(x,z)$E(y,z) for all z0)S. A strategy that dominates all other strategies will be
called dominant. Notice that in partnership games if a strategy x0)S is dominant
then it achieves the maximal average payoff which is equal to the maximal payoff.
THEOREM 3.4: 
If ’(S,E) is a partnership game in which e0S is dominant then
G={x0)S s.t. E(x,x)=E(e,e)} is the unique Evolutionarily Stable Set (ES Set).
PROOF: 
Since e dominates all other strategies and ’ is a partnership game, e
achieves the maximal payoff. From theorem 3.3 it follows that G is an ES Set.
To show uniqueness, let Lf)S be an ES Set. Since a mutant of type e can
always enter and do at least as well as each other type it follows that e0L and
therefore LfG. Actually a stronger conclusion follows: each connected disjunct
component of L must contain e. This however implies that L is connected and
therefore that L=G. 
G
Finally we present a purely technical lemma that comes in handy when
looking for ES Sets.
LEMMA 3.5: 
Let ’(S,E) be a partnership game, let Gf)S be an Evolutionarily Stable Set
(ES Set) and let p0G. Then 
i) E(p,p)$min{E(e,e), e0C(p)}=min{E(e,h), e,h0C(p)}. 
ii) If E(h,h)=E(h,e)=E(e,e) for some e,h0C(p), e￿h then there exists a strategy q0G
with strictly smaller support than p, i.e., C(q)dC(p) (C(q)￿C(p)).18
PROOF:
Let Gf)S be an ES Set and p0G. Let ",$$0, e,h0C(p) and z0)S be defined
such that p="e+$h+(1!"!$)z. Define q=("+$)e+(1!"!$)z. Since C(q)fC(p) which
implies q0BR(p) we conclude by part iii) of theorem 3.3 that E(q,q)#E(p,p). We now
make a simple calculation.






So E(q,q)#E(p,p) if and only if
($+2")E(e,e)+2(1!"!$)E(e,z)#$E(h,h)+2"E(e,h)+2(1!"!$)E(h,z) if and only if
2E(e,p)+$E(e,e)!2$E(e,h)#2E(h,p)!$E(h,h).
Using the fact that E(e,p)=E(h,p)=E(p,p) we obtain that E(q,q)#E(p,p) if and
only if E(e,e)+E(h,h)#2E(e,h).
Therefore E(e,h)$min{E(d,d), d0C(p)} and with E(p,p)$min{E(e,h), e,h0C(p)}
part i) is proven.
Exchanging the weak inequality by an equality sign in the above calculation it
follows that if E(e,e)=E(h,e)=E(h,h) then E(q,q)=E(p,p) and hence q0G. Since
C(q)dC(p) and C(q)￿C(p), part ii) is proven.
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4. Partnership games with cheap talk:
Recall the previous framework, in an infinite homogeneous population, the
individuals are pairwise randomly matched without asymmetries to play a
partnership game ’(S,E). Each individual plays a fixed pure strategy. The
frequencies of the types playing the same pure strategy adapt according to the
replicator dynamics. In this setup we search for Asymptotically Stable Sets (AS
Sets). 
We will now introduce costless communication before the game is actually
played in the form of cheap talk. The enlarged game now consists of two rounds, a
signalling round and an action round. In the first or signalling round the two players
simultaneously send a message from a finite set of messages M={c ,..,c } to the
1 n
other player. "Talk is cheap" because there is no cost of sending this message.
Then in the second or action round each player chooses a pure strategy of the
partnership game ’(S,E) conditioned on the messages sent in the first round.
Finally each player receives his payoff E( ) based on the strategy combination
played in the second round. Mixed strategies of the enlarged (or communication)
game are just randomizations over the pure strategies described above. W.l.o.g. it
is assumed for simplicity that each player only conditions his action on the message
received from the other player, not on the message he sent.
Although formally correct, we do not condition the strategy a player plays in
the second round on the message he sent in the first round. Each player knows
which message he sent and there are no mistakes. Additionally rationalization about
why the individual plays a certain strategy does not arise because each individual is
endowed with some fixed type. Adding these reactions leads to duplification of the
present strategy which does not change the results because the notion of an
Evolutionarily Stable Set and that of an asymptotically stable set are independent of
spurious duplification.
Following Kim and Sobel (1991), a communication game ’(S ,E ) is defined
c c
by the set of pure strategies S =M×S  and the payoff function E :)S ×)S 6U
c M          c c c
satisfying E ((m ,f ),(m ,f ))=E(f (m ),f (m )) for (m,f)0S , i=1,2 and linearity in both
c 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1     i i c
components. So the pure strategy F=(m,f)0S  has the interpretation that the
c







the action round after receiving the message m'0M from the other player in the
signalling round. A mixed strategy is then an element of )(M×S ). 
M
Our goal will be to analyze the replicator dynamics of ’(S ,E ) for pure
c c
strategy types, i.e., each type is endowed with a pure strategy in S .
c
Instead of (m,f) we will also write (m|f) and sometimes we will write F0S  in
c
the form  "(c|f) where "$0,  "=1 and f0{)S} . For F0)(M×S ) let BR (F) be i     i   i
i i           i M     M     c
the set of best replies to F (in the communication game), i.e.,
BR (F)={F'0)(M×S ) s.t. E (F',F)$E (FE,F) for all FE0)(M×S )}.
c M     c c       M
Certain properties of symmetric two person games do not change when
cheap talk is introduced. Each of the following statements are independent of
whether we consider the communication game ’(S ,E ) or the underlying game
c c
’(S,E): 
i) The game is a partnership game.
ii) The maximal payoff is equal to z for some z0U.
iii) The maximal average payoff equals the maximal payoff.
However the following phenomena might occur when cheap talk is
introduced:
iv) The maximal average payoff is larger with cheap talk than without.
v) Without cheap talk the game has a dominant strategy, with cheap talk it has no
dominant strategy.
Following statement i) and theorem 3.2 we will characterize the ES Sets of
the communication game.
Statement iv) is true when the maximal payoff is not achieved in a symmetric
outcome. To give an example for statement v), consider the game of table I with
(a,b,c)=(2,1,0). Notice that T is a dominant strategy and, as a singleton set, is the
unique ES Set (theorem 3.4). Consider the communication game with M={L,R} as







dominant strategy. Let (A|C,D) be the strategy, play A in the first round and play C
(D) in the second round if the other player played L (R) in the first round where
A0{L,R}, C,D0{T,B}. For example, (L|T,T) is not a dominant strategy because
E ((L|T,T),(L|B,T))<E (R|T,T),(L|B,T)). Similarly (R|T,T) cannot be a dominant
c c
strategy. 
In the line of the above example a more general statement for partnership
games can easily be proven: unless the best reply of the dominant strategy in the
original game is the entire set of strategies )S then there is no dominant strategy in
the communication game.
Despite the destruction of dominant strategies when cheap talk is introduced,
their stability remains as stated in the following theorem (compare to theorem 3.4).
THEOREM 4.1: 
If ’(S,E) is a partnership game in which e0S is dominant then {F0)(M×S )
M




Let G={F0)(M×S ) s.t. E (F,F)=E(e,e)}. The proof is similar to that of theorem
M     c
3.4. E(e,e) is the maximal payoff in the original game and hence also in the
communication game. Therefore it follows by theorem 3.3 that G is an ES Set. 
We now need to show uniqueness. 
Let G'0)(M×S ) be an ES Set and let F0G' where F= "(c|f) and f0{)S} .
M                   i i     i M
i
Let I(e)0S  be such that I(e)(c)=e for all 1#i#n and let F = "(c,I(e)). Then
M        i             e i
i
F 0BR (F) and E (F ,F )=E(e,e). From part iii) of theorem 3.3 it follows that F 0G',
e c     c e e                     e
E (F,F)=E(e,e) and therefore G'fG. 
c
We will now show that (c ,I(e))0G'.
1
Applying part ii) of lemma 3.5 repeatedly to F  it follows that
e
{(c,I(e)) s.t. ">0}fG'. If " >0 then we are finished. Otherwise choose some i such
i
i     122
that ">0. It follows that (c ,I(e))0BR ((c,I(e)) and E ((c ,I(e)),(c ,I(e)))=E(e,e) and i
1 c i     c 1 1
hence applying theorem 3.3 again we get (c ,I(e))0G'.
1
Finally, just as in the proof of theorem 3.4, we can show that (c ,I(e))0G' for
1
any ES Set G' and therefore G'=G must hold.
G
So in partnership games with a pure strategy that dominates all others, with
or without cheap talk there is a unique Evolutionarily Stable Set (ES Set). It seems
generally true that if a game has a dominant pure strategy then cheap talk should
have little or no effect on the basic stability properties. However this is not true. In
the appendix we present a symmetric two by two game with a pure dominant
strategy that achieves the efficient payoff. Without cheap talk there is a unique
Asymptotically Stable Set (AS Set) that corresponds to an ESS. However after
cheap talk is introduced, there are no more AS Sets. Such a complete destruction
of stability by introducing cheap talk cannot happen in partnership games because
following theorem 3.3 and statement i) above an AS Set always exists in such
games.
We now come to some results that follow the intuition that cheap talk should
lead to higher payoffs in the context of a reasonable dynamic adjustment process.
Let us consider the communication game based on the game in table I with
the parameters (a,b,c)=(2,0,1) and the set of messages M={L,R}. Notice that the
maximal payoff is equal to the maximal average payoff. S ={(A|B,C), A0{L,R},
c
B,C0{T,B}} is the set of pure strategies of the communication game, i.e., the set of
possible types in the population. Table II shows the payoffs to the row player
between the eight pure strategies in the communication game (LBT=(L|B,T)).23
LTT LBT LTB LBB RTT RTB RBT RBB
LTT 2 0 2 0 2 2 0 0
LBT 0 1 0 1 2 2 0 0
LTB 2 0 2 0 0 0 1 1
LBB 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
RTT 2 2 0 0 2 0 2 0
RTB 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 1
RBT 0 0 1 1 2 0 2 0
RBB 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1
Table II: The payoffs to the row player of the partnership game of table I for
(a,b,c)=(2,0,1) with cheap talk using the message set {L,R}.
Let <(A|B,C),(D|E,F)>={8(A|B,C)+(1!8)(D|E,F), 80[0,1]}. It follows from
theorem 3.3 that {x0)(M×S ) s.t. E (x,x)$E (y,y) for all y0)(M×S )}
M     c c       M
={x0)(M×S ) s.t. E (x,x)=E(T,T)}
M     c
=<(L|T,B),(L|T,T)>c<(L|T,T),(R|T,T)>c<(R|T,T),(R|B,T)> is an Evolutionarily Stable
Set (ES Set) of the communication game (i.e. of the game in table II).
Playing the strategy that gives the maximal payoff is "stable" with and without
communication. This is however not the case with the inefficient symmetric Nash
equilibrium strategy of the original game, B. Although {B} is an ES Set in the original
game we will see that its evolutionary stability vanishes when cheap talk is added.
Consider a strategy that plays B disregard of what message is received. If such a
strategy is in an ES Set of the communication game then there will be strategies
that do no send each message, especially (L|B,B) will be in the set. In such a
population the signal R is not sent and mutants can enter that send R and play T if
R is sent, i.e., they are of type (R|B,T). Since the type is in the best reply of (L|B,B)
and achieves the maximal payoff, mutants of that type will take over.24
In order to prove this result generally we will first present a theorem that
characterizes all ES Sets that contain a strategy that does not send each message.
For any F0)(M×S ) we will say that F does not send each message in M if
M
there exists a message m0M such that if m'0M, f0S  and (m'|f)0C(F) then m￿m'.
M
THEOREM 4.2:
Let ’(S,E) be a partnership game, M be a finite message space and
F*0)(M×S ) be such that F* does not use each message in M. Then F* is in an
M
Evolutionarily Stable Set (ES Set) of the communication game if and only if F*
achieves the maximal payoff.
PROOF: 
Let m0M be the message that F*0)(M×S ) does not send. 
M
Proof of the "only if" statement:
Assume that F* is in an ES Set G but does not achieve the maximal payoff,
i.e., E(e,h)>E (F*,F*) for some e,h0S. Since F* does not send m it cannot prevent
c
mutations from occurring in its reactions to receiving m. Let FE0)(M×S ) be
M
identical to F* up to the fact that FE always reacts to receiving m by playing h. Then
FE0BR (F*) and E (FE,FE)=E (F*,F*) and by part iii) of theorem 3.3 it follows that
c     c c
FE0G. Now FE cannot prevent a mutant from entering that sends m and always
plays e, i.e., of type (m,I(e)). We obtain E ((m,I(e)),FE)=E(e,h)>E (FE,FE) which
c c
contradicts the fact that FE is in the ES Set G.
Proof of the "if" statement: 
If F* achieves the maximal payoff then by theorem 3.3 it is in an ES Set.
G
It follows that either an ES Set achieves the efficient payoff or each of its
elements sends each message. 
We now are able to prove that inefficient strategies of the original game will
be "eliminated" by cheap talk. For F*0)(M×S ) and x0)S we will say that x is
M







itself, i.e., (m|f)0C(F*) for i=1,2 implies f (m )=x.
i i         1 2
COROLLARY 4.3:
Let ’(S,E) be a partnership game, M be a finite message space and
F*0)(M×S ) and x0)S be such that x is played in F* for sure. Then F* is in an
M
Evolutionarily Stable Set (ES Set) of the communication game if and only if x
achieves the maximal payoff in ’(S,E).
PROOF:
Following part ii) of lemma 3.5 it follows that w.l.o.g. F* does not send each of
its messages. Theorem 4.2 then implies the statement.
G
It follows that in the above example the evolutionary stability of B is
destroyed and only the evolutionary stability of T remains with cheap talk. However
we will see that cheap talk not only eliminates ES Sets but creates new ones.
Theorem 4.2 implies that elements of these "new" sets must send each message.
We will see that these sets come in the way of any efficiency result that might be
conjectured on the grounds of theorem 4.2. 
In the following we will develop some general properties of ES Sets of the
communication game. We will need the following lemma. It makes a connection
between the ES Sets of the communication game and those of the underlying
game.
LEMMA 4.4: 
Let ’(S,E) be a partnership game, let M={c ,..,c } be a set of messages and
1 n
let B0)(M×S ) be written in the form B= "(c|f), where f0{)S} , "$0, 1#i#n and
M             i i     i M
i       i








’(S ,E ) and ">0 (1#i#n) then f(c) is in an Evolutionarily Stable Set (ES Set) of the




Let G  be an ES Set of ’(S ,E ) containing B. W.l.o.g. assume that " >0. For
c            c c
1
y0)S define F(y)= "(c|g) such that g (c )=y and g(c)=f(c) otherwise i
i i       1 1     i j i j
(1#i#n,1#j#n). Then for y,z,u,v0)S, E(y,z)>(=)E(u,v) if and only if
E (F(y),F(z))>(=)E (F(u),F(v)). Therefore the conditions on the ES Set G  of the
c c                 c
communication ensure that G={x0)S s.t. F(x)0G } is an ES Set of the original game.
c
Finally G contains f (c ). 
1 1
G
The following theorem shows that cheap talk shifts the set of payoffs in
Evolutionarily Stable Sets (ES Sets) upwards. More specifically, all average payoffs
of ES Sets in the communication game are at least as large as the minimal average
payoff of an ES Set of the game without cheap talk, and they are strictly larger if the
efficient payoff is not equal to the minimal average payoff of an ES Set. Moreover
there exists an ES Set of the communication game with average payoff that
converges to the maximal payoff as the number of messages tends to infinity. 
THEOREM 4.5:
Let ’(S,E) be a partnership game and let M be a finite set of messages with
|M|$2. Let µ=min{E(x,x) s.t. x0G and G is an ES Set of ’}, 0=max{E(x,x), x0)S} and
B=max{E(x,y), x,y0)S}. Then
i) if F0)(M×S ) is in an Evolutionarily Stable Set (ES Set) of the communication
M
game ’(S ,E ) then E (F,F)$µ, if additionally B>µ then E (F,F)>µ and
c c     c           c

























Part i) Let Gf)S  be an ES Set containing F. Part i) of lemma 3.5 implies that
c
E (F,F)$min{E ((c,f),(c,f)), (c,f)0M×S }. Furthermore, it follows from lemma 4.4 that
c c i i   i M
for (c,f)0C(F) (c0M and f0S ) f(c) is in an ES Set of ’(S,E). Therefore
i   i     M   i
E ((c,f),(c,f))=E(f(c),f(c))$µ.
c i i i i
Assume additionally that E (F,F)=µ<B. Part i) of lemma 3.5 implies that
c
E (h,e)=µ for all e,h0C(F). It follows then by part ii) that not all elements of G send
c
all of their messages. Finally, theorem 4.2 implies that E (F,F)=B and with B>µ we
c
get a contradiction.
Part ii): By theorem 3.3 it is enough to show that
max{E (F,F), F0)(M×S )}=(1! )B+ 0. If B=0 then the claim follows by definition.
c   M
So assume B>0. 
Let q= $(c|g), g0{)S} , $$0, 1#i#n and  $=1. Then i     i       i
i i   i M
E (q,q)= $ E(g(c),g(c))+ $$E(g(c),g(c))# $ 0+ $$B
c 2 i i i i i j j i 2
i i j i i j
=B!(B!0) $ #B!(B!µ)/n. i
2
Furthermore let x,u,v0)S be such that E(x,x)=0 and E(u,v)=B. If $= , f(c)=x i
i i
and (f(c),f(c))=(u,v) for 1#i#n and i<j#n then E (q,q)=B!(B!µ)/n. 
i j j i             c
G
So cheap talk increases the highest and the lowest average payoff in an















5. Efficiency in partnership games:
In this section we will address the question whether cheap talk can
guarantee efficiency. Using theorem 4.5 we will now characterize the Evolutionarily
Stable Sets (ES Sets) for each partnership game with two strategies (see table I).
Especially we obtain in this special class of two by two games that cheap talk
achieves "near" efficiency, i.e, the average payoffs in Evolutionarily Stable Sets (ES
Sets) are arbitrarily close to the maximal payoff if the message set is sufficiently
large.
Using theorem 3.3 and the fact that the union of ES Sets is an ES Set it is
enough to characterize the connected ES Sets.
THEOREM 5.1: 
Let ’(S,E) be a partnership game with the strategies S={T,B} and for some
n$2 let M={c ,..,c } be a set of messages. Let G={x0)(M×S ) s.t. E (x,x)$E (y,y) for
1 n               M     c c
all y0)S}. We will distinguish three cases (see table I):
[a$b and b$c] or [a=c>b]: Either ’(S,E) has a dominant strategy or it has two
strict symmetric equilibria such that E(B,B)=E(T,T). It follows that G is the only
Evolutionarily Stable Set (ES Set) in the communication game.
[a>c>b]: ’(S,E) has two strict symmetric equilibria such that E(B,B)<E(T,T).
There are exactly two connected Evolutionarily Stable Sets (ES Sets) in the
communication game, namely G and {p } (the latter coincides with an ESS) where
n
p = (c|f), f:M6S such that f(c)=B and f(c)=T when i￿j (1#i#n, 1#j#n) and
n i i   i       i i     i j
E (p ,p )=(1! )E(T,T)+ E(B,B).
c n n
[b>a$c]: ’(S,E) has a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium (v,v) that is not
pure. There are finitely many connected Evolutionarily Stable Sets (ES Sets) in the
communication game, each coincides with an ESS. The set consisting of these
ESS's is { (c|f) s.t. f:M6)S, f(c)=v and (f(c),f(c))0{(T,B),(B,T)} when i￿j (1#i#n,









T a,a 0,0 0,0
M 0,0 b,b 0,0
B 0,0 0,0 c,c
Table III: A partnership game with three
strict equilibria when a>b>c>0.
1#j#n)}. Each of these ESS's achieves the average payoff (1! )E(T,B)+ E(v,v).
PROOF: 
The following claims simplify the calculations.
Let F= "(c|f) be in an ES Set of ’(S ,E ) and assume that ">0. Following i                       i
i i               c c
lemma 4.4, f(c) must be in an ES Set of ’(S,E). If additionally F does not achieve
i i
the maximal payoff then from Lemma 3.5 and theorem 4.2 it follows that
E (F,F)>min{E(f(c),f(c)), (c|f)0C(F)}. 
c i i i i   i i
The rest of the proof follows with simple calculation and using theorem 4.5. G
However the "near" efficiency result of theorem 5.1 is generally not true for
more than two strategies. We present a partnership game (that is a unanimity
game) with three strategies in which the communication game has an Evolutionarily
Stable Set (ES Set) with an average payoff that is not close to the maximal average











Let n$2, M={c ,..,c } be the set of messages and let p= (c|f), f:M6S such
1 n                 i i   i
that f(c)=B and f(c)=M, i￿j, 1#i#n and 1#j#n. It is easy to verify that p is an ESS of
i i     i j
the game in table III with cheap talk using the set of messages M and that
E (p,p)=(1! )b+ c<b<a.
c
Notice that it is quite essential for the inefficiency result that the message set
is finite and fixed. If each mutant that wants to enter may introduce a new signal like
in the secret handshake model of Robson (1990) then a mutant will be able to enter
the above population and as in theorem 4.5 it follows that the average payoff in an
ES Set must be the maximal payoff. Besides issues concerning intuition there are
existence problems in such a model. Consider a partnership game where the
maximal payoff is not generated in a symmetric equilibrium, like in the two by two
partnership game with parameters (a,b,c)=(1,2,0). Mutants will constantly enter,
causing the number of types to go to infinity.31
6. Discussion:
Various models analyzing the effect of communication on the outcomes of
evolutionary processes of games loosely described as coordination games have
independently come to the conclusion that communication leads to efficiency. We
set up a very simple model and obtain among other things that cheap talk leads to
outcomes that are close to the efficient one when the partnership game has only
two strategies and the message set is large. Although a bit weaker, this result
seems to go in the same direction as the previous findings. However, for more than
two strategies we show that the outcomes must not even be near to the efficient
one. This we will refer to as our inefficiency result. Due to these grave differences in
the predictions between our model and previous findings we now wish to discuss
the related literature and point out the differences in the models themselves that
lead to the different results with respect to the efficiency of the outcomes.
Matsui (1989) applies best response dynamics to two by two pure
coordination games - in particular partnership games are symmetric pure
coordination games. They show that the set of pareto efficient outcomes is the
unique Cyclically Stable Set. This result seems to hold generally for pure
coordination games with a finite set of pure strategies. The main difference to our
model is that they consider a population with two types (e.g., row and column
player): in the random matching process a player of one type is always matched
against a player of the other type. This presents a coordination device that is built in
the matching process. The aim of our analysis is to see how identical players can
coordinate using cheap talk without external "help". Hence we choose a model with
symmetric matching.
Later, Matsui (1991) reformulates his results for two by two games of
common interest. These are games that have a unique weakly pareto optimal
outcome.
Kim and Sobel (1991) analyze cheap talk in a related kind of game of
common interest and - without mentioning it - their analysis implicitly assumes a two32
type population like that of Matsui (1989, 1991). They consider games in which the
row player achieves his maximal payoff if and only if the column player achieves his
maximal payoff - in this definition partnership games are included. Kim and Sobel
(1991) prove efficiency of their static solution concept called Equilibrium
Evolutionarily Stable Sets (ES Sets). The result is comparable to that of Matsui
(1989, 1991), however they differ in the method. Their static concept is based solely
on intuitive considerations, not on any explicit dynamic adjustment process.
Wärneryd (1991) analyzes a static concept in the symmetric setup we refer
to as random symmetric matching in a homogeneous population. They characterize
the weak Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (weak ESS, the definition is due to
Thomas, 1985) that are pure of two by two unanimity games with cheap talk. The
definition of a weak ESS is similar to the definition of an ESS just that the strict
inequality is replaced by a weak inequality. A unanimity game is a partnership game
in which the payoff is positive if and only if a strategy is matched against itself,
otherwise the payoffs are zero. The result states that a pure strategy is a weak ESS
(Wärneryd (1991) calls it a Neutrally Stable Strategy) if and only if it achieves the
efficient payoff. 
The basic structure to which Wärneryd (1991) applies the static concept is
the same as in our model. However, the analysis in the paper is somewhat
incomplete. There is no mentioning of the dynamics although it is apparent: weak
ESS's are stable (see Thomas, 1985). The result is limited to the case of two
strategies. They state that their result is not true for more than two strategies (e.g.,
analyze the example in table III in section 5) but do not consider this more general
case any further. Additionally the weakening of the ESS condition is motivated by
non-existence problems - these however result from the unusual restriction of the
ESS condition to pure strategies. As shown in theorem 5.1, (mixed strategy) ESS
do exist for unanimity games with cheap talk.
Finally, Robson (1990) considers a model with a slightly different form of
communication. They assume secret handshakes among the mutants, i.e., the
mutants can recognize other mutants that entered at the same time, all other types
cannot distinguish them. Robson (1990) considers two by two unanimity games and33
restricts the analysis to secret handshake mutants that play a pure strategy that is
not equal to the population mean strategy. In this restricted framework the strategy
that achieves the efficient outcome is the only one that can resist such mutations.
The intuition that leads to efficiency in their model also drives the partial efficiency
result of our model for the case where not all messages are sent (see theorem 4.2).
There are however some details missing in their analysis to make it a complete.
They do not include every possible type of mutant so that the stability of the efficient
ESS is not fully justified. When formalizing the model completely some slight
difficulties seem to arise. Without some additional assumption, like cost of entry,
there is no way to prevent an infinite number of different types of mutants to be
present in the population. 
As demonstrated above, the previous literature predicts efficiency in models
of dynamic adjustment in games with cheap talk. In contrast to this stands our
inefficiency result (section 5). We now argue the robustness of our result to
changes in the model and alongside present the intuition that leads to our
inefficiency result. This will then be compared to the intuition that leads to the above
efficiency results.
First of all we will show that our inefficiency results are not due to the
difference between the replicator dynamics and the best response dynamics.
What results can be derived when the best response dynamics are applied to
our model of cheap talk, i.e., when the asymmetries are dropped in the model of
Matsui (1989, 1991)? A strategy is called socially stable if no other strategy is
accessible from it in the best response dynamics (see Matsui, 1992). Matsui (1992)
mentions that an ESS is a socially stable strategy. It follows that the inefficient ESS
that is presented in section 5 is a socially stable strategy. Therefore once the
asymmetric coordination device apparent in the form of the two type population is
removed from the model, the efficiency result of Matsui (1989) breaks down. So the
difference in the dynamic processes does not drive the difference in the results.
Is the fact that an ESS can support inefficient equilibria in the game with
cheap talk intuitive or just a mathematical peculiarity of this model? We claim that34
our results are typical under the assumption of finite message sets, costless
communication and no asymmetric coordination device - not due to the choice of
cheap talk as a model of communication.
In a more realistic model of communication one might introduce
communication in finitely many rounds and perhaps give a meaning to the
messages exchanged. However in any model without an asymmetric coordination
device the situation can arise in which each strategy gets a higher payoff against a
different strategy in the population support than against the same. Consequently an
individual wants to avoid being matched against his own type. This we refer to as
the meeting dilemma. When restricted to these strategies all possible messages will
be sent to maximize the probability of not meeting the same type. Notice that
flipping a coin between the two players to determine who starts talking does not
resolve the problem. 
How can cheap talk lead to efficiency in models of dynamic adjustment?
Assume that there is a strategy that is not in the best reply of the present population
mean that achieves a higher payoff than any strategy in the support. 
Consider the framework presented in this paper. Using cheap talk a mutant
can coordinate when matched against another mutant to get this superior payoff.
Since only a very small frequency of mutants may enter the population the mutant
must play a best response to the average population strategy in order to enter. So
the mutant must send a message that no one in the present population uses so that
he can tell when he is matched against another mutant and not against a type in the
former population. This signal serves as a secret handshake between the mutants
and the mutants will slowly take over if they are not punished by the original
population for using the different message. If a message is not sent in the
population then arbitrary mutations can occur in the way the population reacts to
receiving this message. Especially there will be a population that does not punish
the entering mutant and hence it will take over.
In best response dynamics the intuition is similar. A type in the population will
offer to play the pareto superior strategy if he receives a different signal. Again this
is only a best reply if there are excess signals.
To summarize, the above described meeting dilemma can result in all
messages being sent, thereby minimizing the probability of meeting the same type.35
However, if there are no excess signals a sort of signal jamming occurs for the
mutants and there is no possibility for a secret handshake and an inefficient
outcome may be stable. 
If an asymmetry is introduced exogenously like in the two type population
model of Matsui (1989) the individuals can coordinate and there will be no incentive
not to meet the same type. Therefore there will be excess signals and secret
handshakes are possible. 
It is therefore demonstrated that the inefficiency result may be natural and
that the efficiency results in the two type model of Matsui (1989) are equally driven
by the population structure as by the pregame communication. 
What is the role of the messages? In fact only two messages are needed to
ensure efficiency in the two type population models of Matsui (1989, 1991) and Kim
and Sobel (1991). Thus their result cannot explain the emergence of large message
sets. In randomly matched populations without asymmetries in the matching
process the players are better off with large message sets (i.e., a rich language)
even though they will not necessarily achieve the efficient payoff. So our analysis
suggests a cause for the emergence of large message sets.
So communication alone cannot ensure efficiency in a model of dynamic




Table IV: A symmetric game with a
dominant strategy.
Appendix - Example in which cheap talk destroys stability:
We present a simple example in which cheap talk "ruins" stability in the
replicator dynamics. Consider the game in table IV.
This game has a unique efficient outcome which is achieved by the dominant
strategy T. {T} is the unique Asymptotically Stable Set (AS Set), in fact T is an ESS.
The stability of the strategy T seems quite robust. However we will show that the
addition of cheap talk will ruin all stability, i.e., there will be no more AS Sets in the
communication game.
We will need the following lemma that is generally true for the replicator
dynamics, here stated informally. Let G be an AS Set. If a pure strategy e
dominates another pure strategy h that is in the support of an element of G then
there exists another element of G  with e in and h not in its support. Assume that
this is not true, i.e., that the minimal relative proportion of the frequency of h to the
frequency of e is strictly positive. Since e dominates h it follows that e will always
reproduce faster than h and hence the relative proportion of the frequencies of h to
e will never increase. Consider the trajectory starting close to the strategy that
achieves the minimum with a strictly smaller relative proportion of the frequencies of
h to e. Because G is an AS Set, the trajectory must converge to an element of G.
However, as stated above, the proportion never increases which contradicts the
minimality of the relative proportion.37
We are now ready to analyze the example. Consider the communication
game ’(S ,E ) of the game in table IV with M={L,R} as the set of messages (see
c c
section 4 for the definitions). 
Assume that Gf)(M×S ) is an AS Set of the replicator dynamics of ’(S ,E ).
M                     c c
Take any F0G. W.l.o.g. (L|g)0C(F) for some g0S . We will apply the above lemma
M
three times to show that G contains a pure strategy and then show that this strategy
is unstable. 
Since (L|T,T) dominates all strategies (L|f) for each f0S , after applying the
M
above lemma repeatedly there exists F*0G such that F*=(1!")(L|T,T)+"(R|r) for
some "0[0,1) and r0{)S} . 
M
If ">0 then apply the same procedure to the component of F* concerning the
signal R, and we obtain that there exists FE0G such that FE=(1!$)(L|T,T)+$(R|T,T)
for some $0[0,1]. 
W.l.o.g. assume that $<1. Applying the procedure a third time we obtain that
(L|T,T)0G. From the payoff structure it follows that (R|B,T)0BR ((L|T,T)) and
c
E ((L|T,T),(R|B,T))=E(T,B)<E(T,T)=E ((R|B,T),(R|B,T)). So it follows that (L|T,T) is
c c
not stable in a population consisting of types (L|T,T) and (R|B,T), and therefore it
cannot be in an AS Set.
So cheap talk brings "confusion" into the replicator dynamics of such games.
However, the fact that T is a weakly dominant strategy is necessary to construct
such a counterexample. It is easy to show that when T is the unique best response
to any strategy that cheap talk does not affect its stability. 
It should be mentioned that best response dynamics behave quite differently
in the above game: it can be shown that the set of efficient payoffs is the unique




Figure 1: Inclusions go in the direction of the bold
arrows. The shaded arrows represent inclusions that
hold for partnership games.
Diagram of the interdependencies of the solution concepts
The following figure presents an overview of the relations between solution
concepts used in the context of evolutionary games and the replicator dynamics.39
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